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HE· BIGGEST AND MOST INTENSE BATTLE IN

··:
\the U.S. health care system during the past
/
three decades has been over two interrelated
/ questions: first; who will control the manner in which
j,- medical car~ is P,aid for, and, second, how much will it cost?
.
Many health care experts believe that Medicare's efforts at
cost control, primarily in the form of the program's seminal
transition to and continual modification of prospective payment of health care providers, has both triggered and
repeatedly intensified the economic restructuring of the U.S.
health care system. Medicare is an almost $600 billion public health insurance program for individuals sixty-five years
of age and older; individuals under sixty-five with certain
disabilities (with eligibility depenqent on the severity of the
disability and the resultant consequences for a person's ability to work), and those with end-stage renal disease). With
regard to how the program reimburses for care, "Medicare
sets prospectively the payment amount (rates) providers will
receive for most covered products and services, and providers agree to accept them as payment in fun:· according to the
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. "Thus, in most
instances, providers' payments are based on predetermined
rates and are unaffected by their costs or posted charges:' 1

"

MEDICARE'S VAST INFLUENCE
Medicare payment reforms have empowered the federal government's effort at cost control in ways that are similar to
health care systems in other industrialized countries. 2 They
have (1) given the U.S. government de facto control over the
price of most medical care and (2) ended the era, dating back
to the 1920s, in which doctors' and hospitals' authority over
medical prices and decision making went virtually unquestioned. 3 The key to Medicare's role as the leading catalyst for
change in the U.S. health care system is the program's

immense size and influence. 4 As the single largest individual
buyer of health care and the "first mover" in the annual payment game between those who provide medical care and
those who pay for it, Medicare invariably drives the behavior
of both medical providers and private payers.
Medicare's revolutionary transition from traditional
cost reimbursement (generally paying hospitals and physicians what they submitted in the way of costs) to a prospective payment model began in 1983. In that year, Congress
changed the program's method of paying hospitals to a system of predetermined payment amounts for individual
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). In 1989, following the
success of DRGs in restraining the rate of growth in
Medicare's hospital expenditures, Congress enacted a similar program-a resource-based relative-value scale with a
standardized fee schedule-for Medicare's reimbursement
of physicians. The program went into effect in 1992. With
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress reformed the
reimbursement processes of the remaining cost-based components of Medicare, including outpatient ambulatory services and post-acute care (such as skilled nursing facilities
and home health agencies). By 2003, twenty years after
Medicare started the payment revolution in America's
health care system, the program had become fully "prospectivized" in its reimbursement of all medical providers.
Medicare also plays a significant role in supporting the
education of health professionals, particularly medical
school graduates training as residents in the nation's more
than one thousand teaching hospitals. The program's direct
and indirect financial support of medical training (direct in
the form of paying the salaries of the residents and the
supervising physicians' time, around $3 billion, and indirect
in the form of subsidizing other hospital expenses associated with running training programs, around $6-$7 billion)
amounted to upwards of$10 billion in 2012.
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Each time Congress changed one part of Medicare
from cost reimbursement to prospective rate-setting, the
overall growth of the program's expenditures slowed. A significant, albeit temporary, measure of cost control was
achieved. Yet these spending reductions have often come at
the expense of health care providers compensating by
increasing their revenues from private payers. "When
Medicare slows its rate of expenditure growth;' explains
David Abernethy, former senior Medicare specialist and Staff
Director of the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee,
"hospitals' overall rate of revenue growth slows and that, in
the end, puts the final pressure on private payers:·s This
increased use of cost shifting (or cross-subsidization or differential pricing) by medical providers, in which changes in
administered prices of one payer lead to compensating
changes in prices charged to other payers for care, propelled
the growth of private sector efforts (namely, managed care in
the 1990s) to achieve similar cost control.
Ultimately, the change in Medicare's reimbursement
policy altered the balance of power between the federal government and medical providers. By increasing the scope and
extent of Medicare's regulation through prospective payment, Congress for the first time gained the upper hand in
its financial relationship with hospitals and then with physicians in terms of setting medical prices. Yet the federal
government has done little to extend Medicare's success in
controlling prices to controlling the volume of services provided.6 Therefore, although Medicare's Prospective Payment
System (PPS) has been more influential than anything else
in rationalizing health care prices in the United States, the
program has never gained major and lasting control over
utilization or total costs. Thus, Medicare's rate of expenditure growth and relatively meager results at cost containment in recent years remain issues of enormous political
concern?
Moreover, Medicare does not cover all health care
costs for its beneficiaries. The program's Part A benefits
cover inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility stays,
home health visits, and hospice care, but there is a deductible ($1,156 in 2012) and coinsurance requirements. The
program's Part B benefits cover physician visits, outpatient
services, preventive services, and home health visits, but
there is also a monthly premium that beneficiaries must pay
($140 in 2012). Also, Part D, the voluntary, subsidized outpatient prescription drug benefit that George W Bush
(2001-2009) signed into law in 2003 and that went into
effect in 2006, also includes deductibles and monthly premiums that vary by drug plan and beneficiary income.

Passage of Medicare's Prospective Payment
System Driven by the Need for Cost Containment
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, rampant medical inflation
forced policymakers to search for ways to control Medicare's

rapidly escalating costs. With doctors and hospital executives in control of the U.S. health care system for decades,
virtually unrestricted cost reimbursement had become the
dominant model for financing public and private medical
care. Independent not-for-profit hospitals and physicians
practicing alone or in small groups dominated the medical
landscape. Notes Bradford Gray,
Third-party payers (both private and public) played their
financing role passively, reluctant to interfere with medical decision-making and the doctor-patient relationship.
They paid for medical care by reimbursing for costs
incurred or charges billed by health care providers and
did little to control which services were provided or how
much they cost.8
The medical inflation that grew directly out of these
delivery structures and payment systems became unsustainable. In 1980, hospital spending grew 16.4 percent, as the
nation's total health care expenditures reached $230 billion,
a threefold increase from $69 billion in 1970.9 In Ronald
Reagan's (1981-1989) first full year in office, hospital spending increased 17.5 percent. 10 The following year the country
slipped into the worst recession in half a century, with the
unemployment rate reaching almost 11 percent.
Out of financial necessity, therefore, Congress and a
handful of state governments commissioned experiments in
alternative reimbursement systems. The most promising
conceptual innovation, prospective payment with predetermined reimbursement rates, was the product of pioneering
research at the University of Michigan and Yale University.
Using data from Connecticut's hospitals, Yale professors
John Thompson and Robert Fetter demonstrated that medical care could be standardized and measured. As a result,
policymakers and administrators were able, for the. first
time, to compare prices across different hospitals for the
same services. They found an enormous amount of unjustifiable variation, which called into question medical providers' authority to regulate their own affairs.

Rising Medical Costs
The deadly combination of inexorably rising medical inflation and deep economic deterioration forced elected leaders
to pursue the radical reform of Medicare to keep the program from insolvency. Federal policymakers-led primarily
by President Reagan's health and human services secretary,
Richard Schweiker (in office 1981-1983)-eventually
turned to the one alternative reimbursement system that
analysts and academics had studied more than any other
and even tested with apparent success in New Jersey: prospective payment with DRGs. Rather than simply reimbursing hospitals whatever costs they incurred in treating
Medicare patients, the new model would pay hospitals a
predetermined, set rate based on a patient's diagnosis. The
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payment would be unrelated to any specific hospital's costs.
Instead, it would be a national payment based on the costs
of a general hospital. Thus, if a hospital could treat a patient
for less than the standard DRG payment, it could keep the
savings as a profit. If it cost the hospital more, it had to
absorb the difference as a financial loss. Once Republican
leaders became convinced that PPS could be used to reduce
federal budget deficits, as well as create new profit and efficiency incentives for hospitals based on an increase in volume, the political obstacles to radically transforming
Medicare finally dissolved.

Hospital industry representatives were already desperate for
any alternative to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act (TEFRA), budget legislation that was primarily aimed at
quickly increasing tax revenue to reduce deficits. However,
congressional leaders of both parties and Reagan administration officials wanted increased control of Medicare to
restrain the program's rate of growth, despite the fact that
prospective payment required significantly increased government regulation and control of health care. Also, with
Social Security literally on the verge of bankruptcy in 1983,
policymakers finally had a legislative vehicle for comprehensive Medicare reform that was unstoppable.

Realigning Financial Incentives
Ironically, the most significant change in health policy since
the passage of Medicare and Medicaid (the publicly financed,
federal-state health insurance program for low-income
Americans) in 1965 went virtually unnoticed by the general
public. Nevertheless, the change was significant. For the first
time in U.S. history, the federal government acquired a sizeable measure of power in its financial relationship with the
hospital industry. Together with Congress's development
and use of the budget reconciliation process, Medicare's new
prospective payment system with DRGs infringed on the
hospital industry's sovereignty and autonomy. Also, the new
and vastly increased amount of government regulation that
Medicare's PPS represented was paradoxical in that it purported to mimic the dynamic forces of the free market. By
realigning financial incentives, policymakers designed the
new system to bring Medicare's rate of cost growth under
control.
Developing a new hospital reimbursement model was
one thing; enacting it was another. A financial crisis affecting Social Security between 1982 and 1983 provided the
Reagan administration and leading members of Congress
with the necessary legislative opportunity to pass Medicare's
prospective payment system as part of a larger and even
more urgent package of welfare state reforms. Mushrooming
budget deficits (stemming from President Reagan's major
tax cuts passed in 1981), together with the highest unemployment rate and the worst recession in decades, created a
sense of fiscal and economic crisis. When the Social Security
boards of trustees released their annual reports on April 1,
1982, they noted that the Social Security system would be
unable to pay cash benefits beginning in July 1983. Medicare's
trust funds were in somewhat better shape, they reported,
but the program still faced serious financial problems,
including bankruptcy, by the late 1980s or early 1990s,
unless changes were made.U
Following a decade of development, experimentation,
and analysis, the passage of Medicare's new prospective payment system with DRGs represented something of an
administrative revolution. Key to policymakers' success was
the strange political attraction of prospective payment.

CHALLENGES POSED BY
CHANGES IN MEDICARE
Following the rapid passage of Medicare's reimbursement
system, a new set of concerns arose: Would the system actually work? Would Medicare's rate of expenditure growth
subside? How would hospitals respond to the new incentives? Would any particular set of hospitals be wiped out
financially by the new system? How would patients be
affected, if at all? The only thing policymakers did know for
sure was that, with a program as imrpense as Medicare, it
was impossible to change just one thing. 12 The ripple effects
of moving to a prospective payment system were bound to
be extensive.

Phase-In Years of Medicare's New
Hospital Cost Containment System
As it turned out, Medicare's new payment model had a major
impact on hospital administration during its four-year
phase-in period. During this time, the hospital industry's
financial view of Medicare patients changed significantly.
Instead of providing as much care as could be medically justifled, hospitals shifted their focus to increasing efficiency and
shortening Medicare patients' length of stay. In so doing, the
PPS operated as a huge shock to the natioris hospital industry, because it completely reengineered the billing structure
accounting for approximately 40 percent of every hospital's
total revenue. The rate of growth in Medicare's hospital
expenditures slowed considerably. Substantial cost control
was accomplished with regard to Medicare hospital payment.
No change in the private sector could ever have effected so
much change in the U.S. health care system in so short a
period of time. The Medicare payment reforms "were the
most drastic and far-reaching changes in federal health policy since the passage of Medicare itself,' notes David Smith.
They were "remarkable for the comprehensiveness and
sophistication of their design-indeed, the sheer technical
achievement was astonishing:•u
Medicare's transition to its new prospective payment
system changed the focus of care. In fact, never had so much
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change in hospital management transpired in so short a
period of time. Previously, because Medicare paid hospitals
whatever costs they incurred, hospitals had no incentive to
control their operating expenses. Higher costs translated
into increased payments from Medicare, which administrators could, and often did, use to expand their hospitals' programs and services. 14 The PPS completely upended this
status quo. By categorizing all hospital services and procedures, the new system allowed policymakers to know what
medical care would cost before Medicare beneficiaries
received it; the PPS established predetermined payment
amounts for 467 different diagnosis-related groups. (In fact,
the number ofDRGs has increased over the years to approximately 536 to account for new procedures and services.) If
the hospital managed to treat a Medicare patient for less than
the DRG allotted, it kept the "savings" as profit. Conversely,
if the hospital incurred more costs than the DRG allotted, it
had to absorb the difference as a loss. 15 As a result, the structure of Medicare's financial incentives flipped. By separating
an individual hospital's level of reimbursement from its production costs, the PPS triggered a radical change in hospital
administration. The focus shifted from providing as much
care as possible to maximizing the overall profit from each
Medicare patient. 16
The initial success of Medicare's new reimbursement
model encouraged a number of key congressional leaders
and the staff of the Health Care Finance Administration
(HCFA; the predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services) to make a series of changes that, ironically, resulted in the PPS becoming more complex and
political rather than less (as originally intended). The process began in the mid-1980s when senior congressional
leaders turned to the PPS as a new and hugely effective
deficit reduction device. By simply restraining the annual
increases in Medicare's hospital payment rates, Congress
was able to divert tremendous amounts of government revenue for reducing annual deficits and increasing spending in
other areas of the federal budget. Congress repeatedly
adjusted Medicare's payment rates at levels below annual
increases in medical inflation, which would not have been
enormously consequential had the hospital industry as a
whole restrained its cost growth. However, it did not. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, hospitals' costs continued to
increase at their pre-PPS levels.
Yet "squeezing" Medicare payments to all hospitals
for larger fiscal objectives struck many policymakers as
unfair, because some hospitals were in a much better position than others to absorb a decline in Medicare reimbursement. Therefore, Congress began selectively
targeting increased payment rates to specific hospital
groups (teaching, rural, inner-city). Along the way, the
original goal of the PPS-to establish one set of national,
wage-adjusted payment rates-became eclipsed by the

new goal of using the PPS to address major federal budget
imbalances. In essence, as Medicare payment policy
became increasingly subordinated to fiscal policy,
Congress sought ways to try to ensure that the inevitable
"rough justice" of moving to a national, standardized payment system would remain as financially fair as possible
to the nation's hospital industry.

Medicare's PPS Triggers Private Sector
Cost Containment with Managed Care
As Congress tightened Medicare's reimbursement policies,
hospitals responded by increasing their charges to private
payers. "Why it took private payers until the early 1990s
before they began to marshal even a modicum of countervailing market power" is perplexing, notes Uwe Reinhardt. 17
However, employers eventually found their paradigmatic
response: managed care. Prepaid group practice, a form of
managed care, did precede Medicare's PPS, but organized
medicine's traditional opposition to any form of reimbursement other than the fee-for-service model associated with
indemnity insurance kept managed care marginalized for
decades. What ultimately made market incentives sufficient to induce a paradigm shift in the private sector away
from indemnity insurance and toward managed care was
the success of Medicare's PPS in controlling health care
costs in the public sector. What is ironic about the rapid
shift in the U.S. health care system from a predominantly
not-for-profit ethos to a more corporate orientation is that
it was largely the incidental byproduct of federal policy
initiatives designed to control Medicare's costs. 18 In other
words, before business behavior triggered the managed
care revolution, and the increased commercialization of
health care that followed in its wake, it was largely a
response to and an unintended consequence of government
policymaking-in this instance, Medicare payment
reforms.
By examining the connections between Medicare's
subordination to budget policy and the rise of managed care,
one finds that government policymakers in the late 1980s
increasingly used the PPS as a powerful tool to address federal budget imbalances and increase spending on other
government programs at the expense of health care providers (particularly hospitals but also physicians). Instead of
increasing the payroll tax for Medicare (1.45 percent paid by
workers and 1.45 percent by employers and deposited into
Medicare's Part A Hospital Insurance Trust Fund) or making
the program's beneficiaries pay more for their medical care,
government leaders unintentionally increased less visible tax
expenditures-tax revenue forgone-by precipitating a significant increase in health insurance costs for businesses. 19
In short, Congress and the George H.W. Bush administration (1989-1993) made it clear that the government was
only going to control Medicare's hospital costs; employers
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were on their own. 20 The hospital industry responded to
Congress's systematic reduction in Medicare's generosity by
increasing the charges billed to their privately insured
patients.l' By its very definition, this billing behavior (most
commonly referred to as "cost shifting") was simply passed
along the payment chain and contributed significantly to
large annual increases in private health insurance premiums.
Ironically, federal tax revenue was forgone in this budgetary process, because private businesses simply absorbed
the increased costs charged by hospitals. Over time, therefore, an increasing number of employers responded to the
growing imperative for cost control by ditching more expensive indemnity insurance for their workers in favor of
cheaper managed care alternatives. This linkage illustrates
that nothing can transform an industry more quickly and
profoundly than when the government-if it is an industry's
single largest customer-dramatically alters how it pays for
goods and services.

Managed Care
Managed care as a term hardly existed until the early
1990s. Yet employers' shifting of their workers away from
fee-for-service health insurance was facilitated by the managed care industry's ability to quickly construct networks
of participating providersY Between 1988 and 1993, managed care organizations responded to employers' demands
for more cost control by consolidating and applying extensive utilization review and guideline development to their
more traditional fee-for-service insurance offerings.B The
traditional managed care organizations, such as staff- or
group-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs)for example, Kaiser Permanente-required significant
expenditures in "bricks and mortar" when entering new
markets. This served as a major barrier to entry because
they were vertically integrated organizations that operated
their own physical facilities in different geographic locations and whose physicians worked solely for the managed
care organization. 24
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however,
many new for-profit HMOs experienced rapid growth
because they were "virtual organizations" or "organizations
without walls;· built largely on contractual (paper) relationships with community providers. 25 These new HMOs
began competing with the traditional prepaid group practices by contracting with networks of private physicians
called independent practice associations (IPAs). In this
newer type of HMO, physicians would provide care for
HMO patients in their own offices, but not at a shared
clinic. This model kept health plans from having to invest
in "bricks and mortar" or hire their own personnel. The
IPA approach also enabled HMOs to enter new markets
more quickly and with much lower capital expenses than
the traditional prepaid group practices.

The initial shift to managed care had a self-reinforcing
quality to it that fed back into the momentum away from
fee-for-service insurance. Managed care organizations initially attracted and enrolled low-risk individuals who were
least likely to object to restrictions on utilization of services
and physician choice. 26 Because these low-risk individuals
also tended to be healthier than the general population, they
did not increase operating costs; on the contrary, they
increased the profitability of managed care organizations. 27
Meanwhile, by expanding their provider base and involving
in their systems more physicians whose predominant practice was fee-for-service, managed care organizations developed to the point that employers took them more seriously
and found them significa?tly more attractive. 28 Why?
Because by increasing their number of affiliated medical
providers, managed care organizations essentially became
more effective "managed cost" plans, which could negotiate
lower prices on behalf of larger numbers of patients and
then pass the savings on to employers. 29 Before this balance
of power shifted to payers in the early 1990s, providers had
set prices and determined fees in most markets. 30 The
advent of Medicare's PPS provided private payers with a
critical benchmark for categorizing and comparing medical
providers' prices.31

Cost Control or a Temporary Success?
During the mid-1990s, employers experienced minimal to
no growth in their health insurance costs, largely because
managed care clamped down on medical spending and
decreased hospitals' ability to charge privately insured
patients more. The United States spent almost .$120 billion
less on health care in 1996 than the Congressional Budget
Office had predicted in its 1993 forecastY With declining
private payments from managed care, the hospital industry
finally achieved significant cost control.
Ultimately, therefore, much of the (temporary) success
in containing Medicare's cost growth came at the expense of
hospitals increasing their revenue from privately insured
patients. Exactly how much hospital cost shifting was specifically caused by Medicare's PPS is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Nevertheless, employers simply bought
into the cost shifting argument made by ProPAC, health
policy journalists, and others, regardless of how much
empirical support there was for it. This confounds the causation question, because if employers believed that cost shifting was driving the inflation in their health care costs (and
then acted on this belief), then that belief was a powerful
influence in its own right.
Moreover, causality comes in different forms. 33 With
respect to prospective payment, explains David Smith, the
image of a river and flooding rains is helpful. The rain
comes down (cost drivers are continually raising the cost of
nedicine), and there are many tributaries-new medical
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technology, rising prices, more elderly patients-filling the
river. The PPS functioned, in part, as a diverting dam that
helped to keep the flood away from Medicare. Yet the water
was simply diverted back into the river. In other words, only
Medicare was (temporarily) sheltered from ever-increasing
medical inflation, and, after the PPS went into effect, the
flooding problem became even worse because more water
(cost drivers) was now moving down a smaller channel. In
short, a huge part of the medical economy, Medicare, was no
longer doing its part to absorb a significant portion of everincreasing medical inflation because it was containing
health care cost growth. This left employers in the private
sector to make up the difference. 34
This cost-shifting phenomenon became a major motivation for businesses to begin moving their workers into
various forms of cheaper managed care. The responsibility
for either paying more for medical care or accepting
increased rationing-which the government chose not to
do-now fell squarely on employers and other purchasers in
charge of health care spending. 35 They quickly moved many
of their employees out of traditional indemnity insurance
and into various forms of managed care.
HMOs, however, sowed the seeds for future trouble by
not fundamentally altering or improving the delivery of
health care (as staff- and group-model HMOs such as
Harvard Community Health, Kaiser Permanente, and
Group Health had done for years in specific areas of the
country, such as Boston, California, and Seattle, respectively). Instead, insurers simply employed the term HMO
and focused on using contracting leverage to both negotiate
discounts from medical providers and impose distant controls on them. The health care that resulted from these new
arrangements was hardly more "managed" than it had been
under traditional indemnity insurance. For these reasons,
and others, managed care's cost containment efforts in the
private sector eventually proved enormously unpopular and
acrimonious in the latter half of the 1990s.

Medicare's Subsequent Cost Containment
Success with Physician Expenditures
The cost-control success associated with Medicare's DRGs
for hospitals led policymakers to rationalize the program's
reimbursement of physicians. They adopted a resourcebased relative-value scale (RBRVS) with a standardized fee
schedule. One goal was to reduce payments to surgeons and
specialists and increase them to internists and general practitioners. The main goal of the RBRVS and fee schedule,
however, was to slow the rate of cost growth of Medicare
Part B (which covers physician visits, outpatient services,
preventive services, and home health visits and accounted
for 20 percent of benefit spending in 2012}; Part B benefits
are subject to a deductible ($140 in 2012), and cost-sharing
generally applies for most Part B benefits. When the new

payment system went into effect in 1992, the growth in volume and intensity of Medicare's spending on physician services slowed dramatically. Thus, the federal government
succeeded in shifting another balance-of-power arrangement, in this instance, from physicians to Medicare.
Through most of the 1990s, Medicare's RBRVS-based
fee schedule was viewed as a significant success by most
observers. A sign of its acceptance is the fact that, much
more than is the case with DRGs, the RBRVS system that
was adopted and maintained by Medicare became adopted
by most private payers. 36 Before the RBRVS system, the private insurers that abandoned the inflationary "usual, customary, and reasonable" payment approach often used
relative value scales that had been based on historic charges,
thereby perpetuating the alleged distortions among the
various categories of services.37 Private payers now typically
rely on the RBRVS relativities, even if they often use different conversion factors to reflect local market factors that
dictate their ability to negotiate fees with physicians. 38
Perhaps because organized medicine was given a major role
in maintaining and updating the RBRVS system through the
Relative-Value Scale Update Committee, physicians generally accepted the resultant shift in relativities of different
services, even if they continued to strenuously object to
expenditure limits (cost containment).
An added benefit of the expenditure limitation mechanism was that it was formula-driven. Congress merely
needed to tinker with some parts of the formula, based on
recommendations from the Physician Payment Review
Commission (PPRC) and HCFA could meet its obligations
to make the necessary changes in the payment systems that
the contractors administered without any disruption in the
flow of dollars to physicians for services rend!!red. 39 With
control over budgetary expenditures for Part B (physician
services}, Congress did not concern itself much with "winners and losers" among the medical profession. Congress
and the HCFA were more than happy to let the American
Medical Association preside over inevitable "food fights"
within the profession when cutting the pie of physician
expenditures. Already having control over physician expenditures, Congress subsequently did not need to include
physician payment as a target of savings in the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997.
Paying on the basis of input costs, however, ignores
whether the services provide value for patients. The assumption had been that what professionals decide to do with
their professional time is the best determinant of value. Yet
even in the mid-1980s, some had argued that Medicare
should set the relative values not just on how physicians
combine inputs to produce services but also on what it gets
as outputs of a fee schedule in terms of benefit to beneficiaries and the program. 40 That is, relative values should reflect
relative value, not merely resource costs. Now, with more
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POLITICS AND HEALTH CARE POLICY~-f ~~~ ~:

President Clinton's and President Obama's Addresses to Congress
President William J. Ointon's (1993-2001) nationally televised address to ajoint session of Congress on September 22, 1993, marked one of the high points of public support
for health care reform during the effort that began during his campaign in 1991 and ended in failure in September l994.1t was the first presidential address ever to Congress
solely devoted to health care reform (lyndon Johnson [1963-1969) urged Congress to pass Medicare in honor of his martyred predecessor, John F. Kennedy [1961-1963],
who had pushed for the program's enactment).
Early polls showed overwhelming margins of public support for President Clinton's plan. Four months later, in January 1994, Clinton reiterated his pledge to veto any
health care reform legislation that emerged from Congress but fell short of universal coverage. However, support for the president's plan eroded over the course of spring
1994 and disintegrated entirely by the end of that summer. Democratic allies in Congress splintered into supporting different alternatives to Ointon's plan, Republicans
united in total opposition, and the general public grew less supportive and more concerned about government efforts at reform in general.
Unless we do this [pass health care reform), ... health care costs will devour more and more and more of our budget. Pretty soon all of you or the people
who succeed you will be showing up here and writing out checks for health care and interest on the debt and worrying about whether we've got enough
defense, and that will be it, unless we have the courage to achieve the savings that are plainly there before us.
President Barack Obama's (2009- ) nationally televised health care reform address to a joint session of Congress on September 29, 2009, sixteen years after
president Clinton's address, was delivered to a more partisan, divided audience. In contrast to Clinton's speech, Obama did not have a detailed presidential reform plan
that he was promoting or trying to explain to the public. Instead, he listed a number of principles he argued were essential for any legislative proposal to receive his
signature. In this way, he delegated far more power to congressional leaders in determining the details of the eventual Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that he
signed into law on March 23, 2010. Another key difference between the two presidents' efforts is that Democrats were the majority in both the House and the Senate for
Obama, while Clinton had only a Democrat majority in the House during his effort.
Then there's the problem of rising cost. We spend one and a half times more per person on health care than any other country, but we aren't any healthier
for it. This is one of the reasons that insurance premiums have gone up three times faster than wages. It's why so many employers-especially small
businesses-are forcing their employees to pay more for insurance, or are dropping their coverage entirely. It's why so many aspiring entrepreneurs cannot afford to open a business in the first place, and why American businesses that compete internationally are at a huge disadvantage.•••
Finally, our health care system is placing an unsustainable burden on taxpayers. When health care costs grow at the rate they have, it puts greater pressure
on programs like Medicare and Medicaid."lf we do nothing to slow these skyrocketing costs, we will eventually be spending more on Medicare and-Medicaid
than every other government program combined. Put simply, our health care problem is our deficit problem. Nothing else even comes close. Nothing else.
Now, these are the facts. Nobody disputes them. We know we must reform this system. The question is how.

than two decades of evidence that physician practice patterns and costs vary significantly without important differences in quality or patient satisfaction, there is increasing
recognition that purchasers, including Medicare, may not
be getting their money's worth for their major investment in
physician services. More specifically, while the volume and
intensity of physician services vary across the country, the
variations seem to make no difference in either quality or
patient satisfactionY
The introduction of Medicare's new physician payment reform also further complicated the doctor-hospital
relationship. Many specialist surgeons petitioned their hospitals to help them make up their income losses from
Medicare, while hospital administrators increasingly pursued joint ventures with physicians for outpatient services in

order to enhance their institutions' revenues, which they
increasingly needed to offset the declining generosity of
Medicare's hospital payments. 42
Ultimately, though, the main problem with the
Medicare physician fee schedule lies in the coupling of
fixed budgets with fee-for-service reimbursements. First,
the appropriate amount to be budgeted for physician services may be difficult to determine. 43 Using historic costs
ignores the reality that technology changes, the population's burden of illness changes, and other factors may significantly alter how much should be allocated to any
particular provider sector, such as physician services. The
1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) altered the calculation of
the volume performance standard by tying spending-perbeneficiary on physician services to the rate of growth in
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the national economy, as reflected in growth in the real
gross domestic product; the new expenditure limitation
was called the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).44 Whatever
the theoretical merits of tying Medicare beneficiary needs
for physician 'services to how the national economy is
doing, the new SGR approach has proved unworkable and
is currently subject to intense attention by Congress and its
advisory bodies.
Second, in a fixed, national budget arrangement, all
physicians have an incentive to overprovide, because gains
from overprovision would typically exceed the losses from
the pro rata reductions that the application of the expenditure limitation produces.45 Under this system, prudent physicians are penalized financially, while profligate ones are
rewarded. The PPRC had hoped that organized medicine
would step up to the challenge of national expenditure limits by taking responsibility for rationalizing the volume of
services through the establishment of clinical practice
guidelines, enhanced peer review, and other professionally
grounded approaches to reducing excessive volume and
intensity of services. 46 It never happened, nor has Medicare
ever achieved significant and sustained cost containment
with regard to the program's physician expenditures.

Maintaining Health Care
Cost Containment Proves Impossible
Following President Clinton's landslide reelection in fall
1996, representatives from both parties returned to using
Medicare as a huge cost-containment mechanism in passing
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The BBA constituted the
ultimate subordination of Medicare to larger fiscal policy
goals; it achieved approximately 73 percent of its total budgetary savings ($224 billion) from reductions in Medicare
spending. 47 The BBA also attempted to capitalize on the cost
containment potential of managed care by encouraging millions of Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in private health
plans as part of a new Medicare+Choice program.
Temporary cost control by both Medicare and managed care in the private sector ultimately led to an economic reckoning that the U.S. health care system
experienced in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Health
care reform by way of "managed competition" in the free
market offered only a temporary solution to the nation's
ongoing struggle with medical inflation. 48 Both the BBA's
major Medicare cuts and the final death throes of restrictive managed care left medical providers in 1998 and 1999

MAP 17.1 Medicare Spending during the Last Two Years of Life for Chronically Ill Patients

NH

MA
AI

U.S. Average (Dollar amount)

~

37,500 46,412 52,000
The amount of Medicare spending on chronically ill patients varies by state, with New Jersey spending an average of almost $60,000
per patient and North Dakota spending less than $33,000 per patient. The spending associated with chronically ill and end-of-life
patients continues to be a major factor in the government's and the health care community's work to control costs.
SOURCE: .'\dapted from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care by DWJ BOOKS LLC.
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with declining payments from both public and private payers. Hospitals and home health agencies were particularly
hard hit. When increasing cost pressures returned in the
late 1990s, growing numbers of medical providers and
managed care organizations found profitability difficult to
achieve and bankruptcy a growing threat.
Eventually, renewed cost pressures, the BBA's significant Medicare cuts, and years of minimal (or nonexistent)
payment increases from private payers left (1) the hospital
industry with its lowest overall margins in a decade; (2) most
physicians with increased workloads, less autonomy, and
often reduced incomes; and (3) a slew of bankruptcies and
near-bankruptcies among a wide variety of health care management and delivery organizations. 49 Yet medical providers
were not alone. Even as managed care organizations experienced their own severe "profitability crisis;· the consumer
and physician backlash against them Jed to an aggressive
legislative and legal assault on the industry. The general
public came to view commercial managed care as responsible for turning doctors "into entrepreneurs who maximize
profits by minimizing care:•so

The Managed Care Revolution Stalls

employers-stalled and surrendered. Managed care organizations dropped most of the business practices that had
restrained (at least temporarily) health care inflation in the
United States. Many of them also dropped their participation in Medicare+Choice, after years of overreaching for
''easy" Medicare profits, which left millions, of the program's
beneficiaries scurrying to reestablish their coverage under
the program's traditional fee~ for-service arrangements.
This increased consolidation and the declining effectiveness of market forces triggered a return to rampant
medical inflation in the 2000s. Health plans and hospitals
successfully negotiated significant payment increases after
years of minimal or no revenue growth, which restored the
majority of them to solid financial health. However, skyrocketing health insurance costs and a sluggish economy left
an additional five million Americans without health insurance coverage by 2003. 52 Medical-related bankruptcies
increased substantially, as did the costs of and enrollment in
Medicaid.
In the midst of these and other deteriorating health
care trends, President George W. Bush and Congress passed
the largest expansion of Medicare since the program's enactment in 1965. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act differed from the
pattern established between the 1983 Social Security reforms
and the 1997 BBA. It added a hugely expensive (almost $550
billion between 2006 and 2015) drug benefit with major

Medical providers hastened the demise of traditional,
restrictive managed care by consolidating into larger networks and practice groups, which vastly improved their
bargaining leverage. A roaring economy in the late 1990s
aided their efforts, because it led employers to request more generous and less
restrictive health plans. By the early 2000s,
most hospitals and physicians . were
receiving sizeable payment increases.
Private health plans followed suit and
pursued their own consolidation strategy.
Many managed care organizations and
traditional health insurance companies
either merged or exited the market altogether. The surviving plans, facing less
competition and more employer willingness to pay higher costs, quickly restored
their profitability by dropping moneylosing patient populations and increasing
premiums. Employers also shifted more
and more of their employees out of lowcost HMOs into less restrictive preferred
provider organizations, which allowed
them to increase their employees' level of
The United States spends more on health care than any other nation in the world,
cost-sharing. 51
about
$8,200 per person per year as of 2012. That figure is more than two-and-aThe result is that the managed care
half times higher than most developed nations in the world, including relatively
revolution-which was principally about
wealthy European countries such as Sweden, France, and the United Kingdom. U.S.
the private sector forcing medical provid- health care now accounts for 18 percent of gross domestic product.
ers (primarily hospitals and physicians) to
provide discounts to health plans and SOURCE: Brendan Smialowski!AFP/Getty Images.
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coverage gaps for millions of people who spend moderate to
high amounts on prescription drugs. 53 It injected the first
elements of means-testing into Medicare, by which wealthier beneficiaries will pay more than poor beneficiaries for
both their Part B (physician and outpatient) services and
Part D drug benefits. It also pushed the program toward

increased privatization with a financial overcommitment to
private health plans that enroll Medicare beneficiaries.
These measures have not resulted in any noteworthy health
care expenditure restraint.
Currently, while about thirty-three million Medicare
beneficiaries voluntarily enroll in the program's Part D

KEY DECISIONS: HEALTH CARE CRISES AND SOLUTIONS~·,. " ,_
Section 3403 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: The Independent Medicare
Advisory Board (also known as the Independent Payment Advisory Board)
This section of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act establishes specific target growth rates for Medicare and charges the Independent Payment Advisory Board
(IPAB) with ensuring that Medicare expenditures stay within these limits. The IPAB must also make recommendations to Congress as to how to control health care costs
more generally. As noted by Bruce Vladeck in 1999 in Health Affairs, the IPAB
will have significant authority to curb rising Medicare spending if per beneficiary growth in that spending exceeds target growth rates. In a process that began
in 2013, recommendations made by the 15-member board will go to Congress for rapid consideration; Congress must adopt these or enact savings of similar
size in Medicare. If Congress doesn't act within a specified timetable, the secretary of health and human services (HHS) must implement the board's recommendations. The board is not allowed by law to recommend changes in premiums, benefits, eligibility, or taxes, or other changes that would result in "rationing" of care to Medicare beneficiaries.

SEC. 3403.1NDEPENDENT MEDICARE ADVISORY BOARD.
(a) BOARD.-(1) IN GENERAL-Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.), as amended by section 3022, is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:

INDEPENDENT MEDICARE ADVISORY BOARD
SEC. 1899A. (a) ESTABLISHMENT.-There is established an independent board to be known as the"lndependent Medicare Advisory Board."
(b) PURPOSE.-It is the purpose of this section to, in accordance with the following provisions of this section, reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare
spending(1) by requiring the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to determine in each year to which this section applies (in this section
referred to as "a determination year'} the projected per capita growth rate under Medicare for the second year following the determination year (in this
section referred to as "an implementation year");
(2) if the projection for the implementation year exceeds the target growth rate for that year, by requiring the Board to develop and submit during the first
year following the determination year (in this section referred to as •a proposal year") a proposal containing recommendations to reduce the Medicare per
capita growth rate to the extent required by this section; and
(3) by requiring the Secretary to implement such proposals unless Congress enacts legislation pursuant to this section.
(c) BOARD PROPOSAlS.(1) DEVELOPMENT.(A) IN GENERAL-The Board shall develop detailed and specific proposals related to the Medicare program in accordance with the succeeding provisions of
this section.
(B) ADVISORY REPORTS.-Beginning January 15, 2014, the Board may develop and submit to Congress advisory reports on matters related to the Medicare
program, regardless of whether or not the Board submitted a proposal for such year. Such a report may, for years prior to 2020, include recommendations
regarding improvements to payment systems for providers of services and suppliers who are not otherwise subject to the scope of the Board's recommendations in a proposal under this section. Any advisory report submitted under this subparagraph shall not be subject to the rules for congressional consideration
under subsection (d).

;

pharmaceutical program, it was designed (and continues to
operate) largely on financing from general revenues, which
are 80 percent of the program's total cost. Many leading
Republicans in Congress were hopeful that forcing the new
benefit to be financed from general revenues would make its
total cost more transparent and, thus, of greater concern in
annual budget negotiations. On the individual level, policymakers also tried to restrain the new benefit's cost growth by
including a "donut hole;· whereby once a Medieare beneficiary reaches $2,930 of Part D spending on pharmaceuticals in
a calendar year, he or she becomes responsible for any additional drug costs accrued up to $4,800, at which point Part
D coverage reengages. Part of the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act includes a gradual phasing out of
the donut hole until its closure by 2020. Part D has been less
costly than originally predicted, largely due to the fact that
only about 77 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have
enrolled in the benefit (rather than the original estimate of
93 percent). Yet monthly premiums have increased each
year of operation by approximately 10 percent and are predicted to continue increasing by the same annual rate.
Additionally, total Part D expenditures will increase from
roughly $85 billion in 2013 to around $150 billion by 2020.

THE IMPACT OF THE PATIENT
.PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT ON HEALTH CARE COSTS
The need for health care cost containment has only become
more urgent in recent years. The landmark passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in
March 2010, along with its constitutional upholding by a
slim 5-4 Supreme Court vote and President Obama's reelection in November 2012, will dramatically increase the number of insured people with access to more health care.
Roughly thirty million currently uninsured individuals
were expected to gain insurance coverage starting in 20 14,
which will cost hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of
the decade. Also, as a demographic tidal wave (the baby
boom generation) began retiring in 2010, the government's
longtime use of Medicare as a fiscal "cash cow" for other
budgetary purposes has become much more problematic
despite the fact that the PPACA depends on hundreds of
billions of dollars in reduced future Medicare payments to
health care providers-mostly hospitals and physicians-to
finance expansions in health insurance coverage.
Furthermore, with health care expenditures constituting 18
percent of gross domestic product and on course to reach
expenditures of 20 percent by 2020, employers and government leaders are hoping that alternative reimbursement
models such as bundled episode payments and capitation to
medical homes and Accountable Care Organizations will
engender better quality and slow cost growth. 54 To date,

TABLE 17.1 Federal Government Spending on and
Financial Support of Health Care in the
United States

Program

Approximate Amount of
Federal Spending (2011)

Tax expenditure on employerprovided health insurance

$260 billion

Medicare

$550 billion

Medicaid (federal portion)

$275 billion

Children's Health Insurance
Program (federal portion)

$8 billion

Department of Veterans Affairs

$90 billion

Indian Health Service

$4 billion

National Institutes of Health

$31 billion

TOTAL

$1.3 trillion

SOURCES: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Management and Budget, Congressional Budget Office.

unfortunately, preliminary pilot studies have given little
reason for observers to be overly optimistic about any major
health care cost containment in the near future.
Ultimately, as health economist Victor Fuchs observes,
It is difficult to see how the health sector can continue to

expand rapidly at the expense of the rest of the economy,
but every past prediction of a sustained slowing of the
growth of health expenditures has been proved wrong.
Rapid growth may continue as a result of political gridlock regarding the form that curbs on expenditures
should take. There is no public consensus about how
much care should be provided for the poor and sick or
how it should be done. Similarly; there's no public consensus regarding efforts to increase the efficiency of care.
A rational approach to the financing, organization, and
delivery of care seems politically impossible. However,
the observation by [Alexis] de Tocqueville [the French
political thinker who toured the United States in the
1830s] that in the United States "events can move from
the impossible to the inevitable without ever stopping at
the probable" may prove to be prescient. 55

See also Chapter 13: Government Financing of Health
Care (1940s-Present); Chapter 14: Biomedical Research
Policy and Innovation (1940s-Present); Chapter 16:
Promoting Health Care Quality and Safety ( 1960sPresent); Chapter 18: Health and Health Care Policy:
Ethical Perspectives (1970s-Present); Chapter 20:
Women's Issues and American Health Care Policy
(1960s-Present); Chapter 21: Minorities, Immigrants,
and Health Care Policy: Disparities and Solutions
(1960s-Present); Chapter 26: Interest Groups, Think
Tanks, and Health Care Policy {1960s-Present).
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